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Abstract—A major goal of current computer network security
systems is to protect the network from outside attackers; however,
protecting the network from its own users is still an unattended
problem. In campus area networks, the risk of having internal
attacks is high because of their topologies and the amount of
users. This work proposes a new approach to identify whether a
network user is having or not a normal behavior, by analyzing
host traffic using top-k ranking similarity measures. The result
of this analysis could be an input of intrusion detection systems.
The document presents an experiment where real-time traffic
of different users in a campus area network is compared to a
reference traffic that corresponds to one of them.
Keywords—computer network, network security, user profile,
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I. INTRODUCTION
On current computer networks, traditional security methods
like firewalls, access control systems and simple Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) are no longer enough to protect
computer systems; day after day, intruders find new ways
to attack computers and systems. This has given rise to the
research and development of new security technology since
1980, when Anderson proposed the first IDS approach [1].
Nowadays, attackers use advanced techniques to go unde-
tected by IDSs, including the following: IP address spoof,
encrypted payload, or even social engineering techniques [2].
A common symptom of an attack using these techniques is
that the host under attack is experiencing unexpected network
behavior. This is why the use of profiles to determine whether
the user is having the expected behavior or not has become
necessary as a new way to detect intrusions.
Many authors have proposed using network profiles [3]–[5].
However, these works focus on the traffic at the border to build
the profiles, losing visibility of internal attacks.
In this work, we propose to build the user profile using the
traffic captured at the host or a nearby point, e.g., the switch at
the access layer. The proposed profile is built upon the remote
services accessed by the host in real time, and treated as a
top-k ranking. In order to determine whether the user behaves
as expected, an attack-free user profile -normal-behavior- is
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built a priori and compared with the current user profile by
means of similarity measures for top-k rankings.
In order to validate our approach, we have built a normal-
behavior profile of a selected user, and then calculated simi-
larities with the same user and with two others.
The present document is organized as follows. Section II
presents some works about user profiling and network traffic
profiling. Section III explains the proposed methodology in
detail. Section IV contains the experimental results. And
finally, Section V concludes the report and suggests some
future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The definition of network user profiles to represent network
behavior has been part of the research into computer network
security.
Kihl et al. [6] present a study of traffic analysis and charac-
terization of Internet users to help understand Internet usage
and the demands on broadband access. They use a commercial
tool for capturing and classifying traffic according to Internet
protocols and applications. The authors conclude that Internet
usage has changed from traditional WWW requests to a more
complex use. Looking at Internet usage in 2010 they found that
most of the traffic came from file-sharing protocols (74%),
media streaming (7.6%), and web-traffic (5.5%). The traffic
for this work was collected from a Swedish municipal FTTH
network.
Sing et al. [3] present an intrusion detection technique using
network-traffic profiling and an extreme online sequential
machine-learning algorithm. The proposed methodology uses
one profiling procedure called alpha profiling that creates
profiles on the basis of protocol and service features, and
a second profiling process, beta profiling, where the alpha
profiles are grouped to reduce the number of profiles. The
authors conducted three different experiments: 1) using all
features and alpha profiling, 2) using only some features
and alpha profiling, and 3) using only some features, alpha
profiling and beta profiling. The best results were obtained
from the last experiment using both profiling methods. The
dataset used for this work was NSL-KDD.
A work that builds profiles of network prefixes instead of
users is presented by Qin et al [4], who propose aggregating
traffic based on network prefixes in order to reduce the amount
of data to be processed, and then calculate clusters using
a k-means algorithm. Qin found that similar users produce
similar traffic; with this information, decisions about security
and management can be taken. The traffic used for this work
was captured at the CERNET backbone.
A similar work is presented by Xu et al. [5], who proposed a
methodology that analyzes Internet traffic. This methodology
first constructs bipartite graphs; after this, it generates one-
mode projections; then, it builds a similarity matrix and
generates clusters with a spectral clustering method; finally,
it analyzes the clusters. The traffic used in this work was
captured at the backbone of a large Internet service provider,
aggregating the information using 24-bit length prefix net-
works, and the network 5-tuple.
As we can see, all the works presented here have used the
traffic captured at a point far from the end-user host, even
outside the users local network, leaving the internal network
security unattended. On the other hand, the usage of profiles
has proved to be viable to either identify or specify network
behaviors.
III. METHODOLOGY PROPOSED
The proposed methodology has the goal of determining how
similar the traffic captured in real time is to the traffic captured
a priori in a controlled environment, i.e., the normal behavior.
The network traffic is captured at the host. For each packet
the following data is collected: a) remote IP address, b)
transport protocol, c) remote port and d) total length.
A. Building normal user behavior
This phase builds a user network profile called normal
behavior, which will be used as a reference for calculating
the similarity factor. Fig. 1 shows the overall process at this
phase
Network traffic PSE,x is captured from user x’s host during
a period of time T in a secure environment in which we can
guarantee that the host will be used only by the expected user
and there are no malware, virus, Trojan or any other malicious
software installed. The period of time T must be long enough
to make sure that habitual tasks are registered.
From PSE,x, a subset p that corresponds to the period of
time [t · · · t+ f ] is selected. From traffic p, a top-k ranking of
accessed services is calculated using the total transferred bytes
as weight measure of each service. The ranking is added to
Kx. This process is repeated while t is less than T . At the
end of each iteration, t increases by ∆t, a value smaller than
f in order to produce overlaps in time frames.
An extraction of a top-k ranking is illustrated in Fig. 2,
where k = 10 and five time frames are listed.
B. Capturing regular traffic
In this phase, regular traffic, PRT,x is captured in real time
from the user x’s host during a period of time [t · · · t+ f ].
Using this traffic, a top-k ranking is built and the best similarity
factor against every top-k ranking in Kx is calculated, as
described in the next section. This factor will be useful to de-
termine whether the current traffic corresponds to the expected
users normal network behavior. This process is repeated the
next time frame: t+ ∆t. Fig. 3 shows the flow chart of the
process.
C. Calculating best similarity factor
The purpose of this phase is to find out if the real-time
traffic captured during a period of time l[t · · · t+ f ] resembles
any traffic within the records of the normal behavior captured
during a period of time of length f . Thus, a similarity factor
is calculated between the top-k ranking of the real-time traffic
(κx) and each of the top-k rankings stored in Kx. According to
this value, a decision might be taken about the correspondence
Fig. 1. Building normal user behavior.
Timeframe Top 1 · · · Top 10
[t · · · t + f] 148.201.129.173:TCP80 ... 148.201.140.50:TCP80
[t + ∆t · · · t + ∆t + f] 148.201.129.173:TCP80 ... 148.201.140.50:TCP80
[t + 2∆t · · · t + 2∆t + f] 148.201.129.173:TCP80 ... 148.201.140.98:TCP339
[t + 3∆t · · · t + 3∆t + f] 132.245.44.2:TCP443 ... 148.201.129.43:TCP80
[t + 4∆t · · · t + 4∆t + f] 148.201.129.148:TCP443 ... 148.201.129.43:TCP80
Fig. 2. Extraction of a top-k ranking
of the current network traffic to the expected traffic. Fig. 4
shows a diagram of this process.
To compare each pair of top-k rankings, it is necessary to
use a ranking similarity measure, but with the peculiarity that
these top-k rankings are non-conjoint rankings; this means that
not all elements of one of them are present in the other. Thus,
we have explored two different measures: 1) Spearmans rho
[7] and 2) Average Overlap [8]. We decide to use the second
measure because it produced better results. This measure, in
general, calculates for each d ∈ {1 · · · k} the overlap at d, and
then averages those overlaps to derive the similarity measure.
Formally, the average overlap between two top-k lists can
be expressed as:






where S and T are top lists of k number of elements, and
AS,T,d is defined as:
AS,T,d =
| S:d ∩ T:d |
d
(2)
Fig. 3. Process of capture real-time traffic from user x.
Fig. 4. Calculating best similarity factor.
Fig. 5 shows an example where the Average Overlap (AO)
between two top-5 lists is calculated.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Experiment setup
The experiment was carried out on a Campus Area Network
(CAN) that has a 16-bit network; it has a Windows domain
controller and uses a HTTP proxy. Campus applications in-
clude web-apps and remote desktop apps. The email service
is provided by Microsoft Exchange Server which was hosted
outside of the campus network.
The target users were full-time professors, who had a
computer with two types of access to the network: a wired
access with a static IP address and a wireless access with a
dynamic IP address.
Five full-time professors (hereafter denoted as users) were
selected for this experiment and, for each one, we generated
his normal-behavior profile KA to KE , and then captured real-
time traffic κA to κE .
Different values of the parameters were evaluated: f =
1, 5, 10minutes, ∆t = 10, 30, 60seconds, the number of
elements selected for the top-k rankings, k = 10, 25, 50, 100,
and both measure functions.
The best tuple < t, δt, k, Function > found was: t =
5min, δt = 10sec, k = 10, AverageOverlap, because
it accentuated the differences between AO(Kx, κx) and all
AO(Kx, κy) where y are the rest of users.
B. Capturing and processing traffic
During a labor week, the normal behavior was captured
from each user’s computer. Before starting to capture, we
checked that no computers had any malicious software in-
stalled. During this period only the owner user had access to
each computer. The average size of the traffic captured was 3
gigabytes per user, involving more than four million packets.
All the packets were processed as described in Section 3.A.
On a different labor week, real-time traffic was captured
from the same computers. This traffic was processed as
described in Section 3.B and all the produced top-k were stored
in a different collection for each user.
C. Similarity calculation and results
From each collection of top-k, two different 1000 top-k sets
were selected randomly, κA1 , κA2 , · · ·, κE1 , κE2 . The best
similarity factor with respect to KA, · · ·, KE was found and
d S:d T:d AS,T,d AO(S, T, d)
1 < a > < x > 0.0000 0.0000
2 < ab > < xc > 0.0000 0.0000
3 < abc > < xcb > 0.6667 0.2222
4 < abcd > < xcby > 0.5000 0.2917
5 < abcde > < xcbye > 0.6000 0.3534
Fig. 5. Similarity calculation of two top-5 lists using average overlap measure.
plotted. Fig. 6 and 7 show respectively the similarity factors
corresponding to κB1 and κC1 against each normal-behavior
KA · · ·KE . We can see that users B and C exhibited a higher
similarity to their own normal behavior than the rest of the
users.
Table I shows the average of the similarity factors of
each evaluation set κA1 ,κA2 , · · ·, κE1 ,κE2 against all normal
behavior sets KA · · · KE . We can observe that the highest
average of each evaluation set is found at the column that
corresponds to the same user (main diagonal).
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have proposed a methodology to determine
how similar the traffic captured in real time at a user host
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Fig. 7. Similarity Factors of κC1 against KA to KE ordered by value
TABLE I. AVERAGE SIMILARITY FACTORS
Evaluation Set KA KB KC KD KE
κA1 0.516 0.434 0.401 0.312 0.267
κA2 0.516 0.434 0.401 0.312 0.267
κB1 0.571 0.920 0.555 0.389 0.322
κB2 0.571 0.914 0.548 0.391 0.330
κC1 0.273 0.419 0.855 0.189 0.354
κC2 0.279 0.417 0.847 0.197 0.354
κD1 0.295 0.179 0.247 0.446 0.293
κD2 0.296 0.176 0.245 0.447 0.289
κE1 0.263 0.336 0.364 0.194 0.553
κE2 0.256 0.335 0.362 0.198 0.552
behavior Kx. We present the results of the implementation of
this methodology.
An early conclusion from this work is that the proposed
user-network profile allows us to determine whether the cap-
tured traffic corresponds to the expected user or not. In the
results of the experiments we can see that a users real-time
traffic has a higher similarity to his own normal-behavior than
that of other users.
From the charts, we can see that only few top-k ranking
from κb1 and κc1 are identical to any top-k from KB and KC ,
i.e., the similarity factor is 1.0. A possible reason for this is
that multiple IP addresses can be configured by the same host
or service, or the user does not actually do exactly the same
thing all the time. But we consider that the average similarity
factors obtained are good enough to differentiate between the
expected user and the others.
In future work, the similarity factors obtained will be
employed by a real-time process that determines how likely
it is for the current traffic to belong (or not) to the expected
user. More experiments are still necessary to determine the
consistency of the proposed methodology.
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